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CONTINUING CRACKDOWN IN
INNER MONGOLIA
March 20, 1992
An Asia Watch Report
A Division of Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch
485
Fifth Ave., 3rd Floor 1522 K Street, NW
New
York, NY 10017 Washington, DC 20005
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© 1991 by Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN 1-56432-059-6
THE ASIA WATCH COMMITTEE
The Asia Watch Committee was
established in 1985 to monitor and promote in Asia observance
of internationally recognized human rights. The chair is Jack
Greenberg and the vice-chairs arc Harriet Rabb and Orville
Schell. Sidney Jones is Executive Director. Mike Jendrzcjczyk
is Washington Director. Patricia Gossman and Robin Munro are
Research Associates. Jcannine Guthrie and Vicki Shu are
Associates. Dinah PoKempner and Mickey Spiegel is a
Consultant.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Human Rights Watch is composed of five Watch Committees:
Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch and
Middle East Watch.
Executive
Committee
Robert L. Bernstein, Chair; Adrian DeWind, Vice-Chair; Roland
Algrant. Lisa Anderson, Peter Bell, Alice Brown, William
Carmichael, Dorothy Cullman, Irene Diamond, Jonathan
Fanton,Jack Greenberg, Alice H. Henkin, Stephen L. Kass,
Marina P. Kaufman, Jeri Laber, Arych Neier, Bruce Rabb,
Harriet Rabb, Kenneth Roth, Orville Schell, Gary Sick, Robert
Wedgeworth.
Staff
Aryeh Neier, Executive Director; Kenneth Roth, Deputy
Director; Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director; Ellen Lutz,
California Director; Susan Osnos, Press Director; Jemera Rone,
Counsel; Stephanie Steele, Operations Director; Dorothy Q.
Thomas, Women's Rights Project Director; Joanna Weschler,
Prison Project Director.
Executive
Directors
Africa Watch Americas Watch Asia Watch
Rakiya Omaar Juan Mendei Sidney Jones
Helsinki Watch Middle East Watch Fund for Free
Expression
Jeri
Laber Andrew Whitley Gara LaMarche
Contents
Introduction
................................................................................................................
1
Update on the 1991 crackdown and new cases of concern
....................... ................. 2
Why
the Crackdown?
.................................................................................................
5
Appendices
................................................................................................................
8
I.
Report on Human Rights Conditions in Inner Mongolia (II)
................... 8
II.
On Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in the Frontier
Regions:
the
Situation and our Views
...............................................................
14
III.
Circular on Matters Needing Attention of Citizens in Their
Contacts with Foreign Nationals in the Open
Cities and Areas of Our Region
......................................................... 19
IV.
Urgent Circular on the Management and Reception
of
Uninvited Groups or Groups to be Invited but Already
Arriving from [Outer] Mongolia
......................................................... 22
V.
Previously Reported Cases of Concern
............................................. 24
VI.
Labor Camps, Prisons and other Detention
Units in Inner Mongolia
.....................................................................
26
Errata for Crackdown in
Inner Mongolia
................................................................
34
1.
Bao'an zhao Labor-Reform Detachment
2.
Baotou Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center
3.
Bayannur League Labor-Reform Farm
4.
Baiyun E'bo Mining District (certain units)
5.
Chifeng Labor-Reform Detachment
6.
Chifeng Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center
7.
Chifeng New Life Tile Factory
8.
Chifeng Precious Stones Quarry
9.
Fengzhen Labor-Reeducation Center
10.
Dongtucheng Farm
11.
Hailar Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center
12.
Harqin Banner Precioue Stones Mine
13.
Hohhot Railways Bureau Remand Center
14.
Hohhot Railways Bureau Labor-Reeducation
Brigade
15.
Inner Mongolia Prison
16.
Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5
Labor-Reform Detachments
17.
Inner Mongolia Regional No.4 Labor-Reform
Detachment
18.
Inner Mongolia Regional Nos.6 and 7
Labor-Reform Detachment
19.
Inner Mongolia Regional Juvenile Offenders
Center
20.
Jining Labor-Reeducation Center
21.
LiJiata Coal Mine
22.
Linhe Municipal Detention Center
23.
New Life Brickyard
24.
New Life Machinery Factory
25.
Tumd Right Banner New Life Coal Mine
26.
Tumd Right Banner New Life Farm
27.
Tumuji Labor-Reeducation Center
28.
Wuhai Labor-Reeducation Center
29.
Wulan Farm
30.
Labor-Reform Bureau of the IMAR
Introduction
In
early May 1991, the Chinese authorities launched a secret
campaign of repression against ethnic Mongolian intellectuals
in China's third largest administrative area, the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). In July 1991, Asia Watch
published a preliminary report on the repression, entitled
Crackdown in Inner Mongolia. That report included our
translation of Document No.13, a top-secret Communist
Party directive explaining and ordering the crackdown; the
text of an urgent appeal issued from the IMAR in late May by
an underground group called the Inner Mongolian League for
the Defense of Human Rights (Neimenggu Baowei Renquan
Tongmeng); and, byway of background, extracts from a secret
Party document of August 1981 which assessed the appalling
damage and suffering inflicted upon ethnic Mongolians in the
region during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).
The
present report provides an update on the ongoing repression
against peaceful dissenters in Inner Mongolia over the past
six months and summarizes other related developments in the
region. It also contains the text of a second appeal document
issued by the Mongolian underground group mentioned above,
together with further confidential documents issued by the
Party in 1990 and 1991 detailing its policies toward ethnic
minorities and setting forth restrictions on access between
inhabitants of the IMAR and foreigners - in particular,
Mongolians from the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic [MPR].
In addition, the report lists details of all the known prisons
and forced labor camps in the IMAR.
The
campaign of repression began in May 1991 with the crushing of
two small private study groups - called the IhJu League
National Culture Society and the Bayannur League
National Modernization Society - which had been formed
over the previous year or so by like-minded Mongolian
intellectuals and Party cadres in an attempt to regenerate the
region's long- suppressed Mongolian ethnic and cultural
identity.1 The groups operated openly and with the
full knowledge of senior local officials and had even applied
for legal registration. According to Document No.13,
issued on May 11, 1991, however, the two groups “used the
discussion of ‘national culture’ and ‘national modernization’.
. . to oppose the leadership of the Communist Party and the
socialist system, and to incite a national split and undermine
the unification of the motherland.”
The
first arrests came swiftly. On the night of May 15, 1991, two
young Mongolians named Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai,2
both leaders of the Ih Ju League National Culture Society
and employees of the league's Bureau of Education, were seized
by security agents at their homes in Dongsheng, the local
capital, and 26 other key members of the society were placed
under house arrest.3 At the time, nothing was known
concerning the fate of those active in the group based in
Bayannur League, a more remote pan of the IMAR and one largely
closed to foreigners.4 Document No.13 had
characterized this group as being more politically radical
than the Ih Ju group, however, and it seemed likely that
particularly stern measures would be taken against its
organizers. Besides these ethnic Mongolian activists, a number
of student and worker demonstrators are also known to have
been arrested in Inner Mongolia after the June 1989 nationwide
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. Those still believed
to be imprisoned there include Tasu, Wang Shufeng and Qian
Shitun, all leaders or members of the Autonomous Federation
of Students from Outside Beijing; Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen
Lihua, Yang Xudong and Zhang Lishan, leaders of the Hohhot
Workers Autonomous Federation; and Zhao Guoliang. a
self-employed garment vendor. (See Appendix V for details.)
Update on the 1991 crackdown and new cases
of concern
On
June 30, 1991, a second appeal statement, bearing the
signature of an ethnicMongolian named Burghud (Bu-er-gu-te
in Chinese) was issued by the underground Inner
Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights (see
below for full text). Nothing is known about Burghud, and the
name may well be pseudonymous. Burghud’s appeal statement
summarized as follows the severe crackdown operation
undertaken by the regional security authorities in the wake of
the May 1991 arrests:
After the events of IhJu and Bayannur
Leagues, Wang Qun [Party Secretary of the IMAR] became
convinced that there are also "illegal organizations" and
"national splittist elements" in the other six leagues and
four municipalities directly under the autonomous region.
Therefore, at the same time as he sent public security and
state security agents to IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, he also
deployed secret police in Hohhot, the capital city of Inner
Mongolia, and the other leagues and municipalities....They are
acting in the utmost secrecy...
In
order to step up the repression, the Beijing authorities have
transferred large numbers of experienced public security and
state security agents from Beijing, Hebei and Shanxi to Inner
Mongolia...More and more people are being secretly questioned,
watched and followed. An increasing number of students,
teachers, cadres and workers are becoming suspects. Some
high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials have also become
targets of investigation. Panic and unease are spreading.
According to sources, the authorities have
expanded their investigations to ethnic Mongolian college
students studying in universities in the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous region and in Gansu, Liaoning and Henan Provinces.
These students are or soon will be facing persecution.5
On
specific cases, the appeal statement reported that one
Bayantogtokh,6 a secondary school teacher and
leader of the Bayannur League National Modernization
Society, had some time earlier been seized by the
authorities, together with seven other key members of the
group, and taken to Linhe, the league's capital. Bayantogtokh
was said to have later been secretly tried (length of
unknown), and there was no further information on the fate of
his seven colleagues.
Concerning the IhJu League National Culture Society,
the statement reported that Wang Manglai, 30, and Huchuntegus,
36, had been placed under so-called “shelter and
investigation” (an unregulated form of police administrative
detention which can mean almost indefinite incarceration
without trial), and transferred to a secret prison in Hohhot,
the regional capital. The prison was said to be administered
by Section 5 of the IMAR Public Security Bureau and to be
designed to hold major political prisoners, Huchuntegus1 wife,
Dabushlatu, was reportedly being subjected to constant
official harassment and persecution, and neither she nor Wang
Manglai’s wife had been informed of their husbands’ place of
detention or allowed to visit them.
Burghud added that the 26 members of the group earlier placed
under house arrest had since been repeatedly interrogated by
the police and subjected to insults, intimidation and physical
abuse, and that eight of them - including one Sechenbayar,
a researcher at the In Ju League's Ghengis Khan Research
Center - would soon be placed under formal arrest. A
“mandatory study campaign” had been launched throughout the
league, moreover, in the aim of forcing the local population
to “repudiate and expose” the group’s alleged “crimes of
national splittism and bourgeois liberalization.”
Another recent case of great concern is that of Ulan Chovo,
37, reportedly a professor of history at the University of
Inner Mongolia.7 Asia Waich has received three
separate reports indicating that Ulan Chovo was arrested
sometime after the May 1991 crackdown (probably on July 11)
and charged with passing confidential documents to foreigners.
According to one report, he had been secretly tape-recorded
and photographed doing so. According to another report, which
came direct from ethnic Mongolian sources in Hohhot, Ulan
Chovo was recently tried in secret and sentenced to five
years' imprisonment.
The
documents in question were almost certainly the first appeal
statement by the Inner Mongolian league for the Defense of
Human Rights and the IMAR Party Committee’s Document
No.13. In September 1991, a journalist named Andrew Higgins,
Beijing-based correspondent for the British Independent
newspaper, was detained and searched at a Chinese airport and
found to be in possession of these documents, the contents of
which he had filed a report on to his newspaper some days
earlier. Higgins was subsequently expelled from the country.8
As noted above, Asia Watch, which had obtained the documents
by an entirely separate channel, in July 1991 published both
documents in full translation. While neither Higgins nor Asia
Watch obtained the documents from Ulan Chovo, it is clear that
the Chinese authorities regarded the publication abroad of
these documents as being a major embarrassment, and it is
likely that no efforts were spared - including even the use of
physical torture - to track down the source of the leak and
obtain a confession. A photograph of Ulan Chovo, obtained from
dissident Inner Mongolian sources living abroad, is included
below.
Another case cited in the June 1991 appeal by the Inner
Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights concerns a
journalism sophomore named Zhang Haiquan, an ethnic
Mongolian, who was arrested shortly after June 4, 1991 (the
second anniversary of the 1989 Beijing massacre) in connection
with “reactionary slogans” - including “Long live democracy”
and “Long live the Guomindang” - which had appeared on a
classroom blackboard at the University of Inner Mongolia.
Nothing further has since been heard of Zhang Haiquan.
Other ethnic Mongolian dissidents known to be imprisoned in
Inner Mongolia on account of their peaceful political beliefs
include a man named Bater, 35, formerly an official in
the government planning commission of Xilin Gol League, and
Bao Hongguang, also 35, an engineer. Both men were leaders
of a large-scale student protest movement against Han
domination of the IMAR that had rocked the region in 1981. In
the summer of 1987, following official persecution, Bao and
Bater escaped across the border to the Mongolian People’s
Republic and sought political asylum there, but were
subsequently extradited back to China and each sentenced to
eight years’ imprisonment. Their current place and conditions
of detention are not known.
In
early 1992, scattered evidence of major incidents of social
unrest having occurred in recent months began to trickle out
from Inner Mongolia. According to the February 1992 issue of
the Hong Kong magazine Dongxiang (“Trends”), for example,
large-scale protest demonstrations in support of Inner
Mongolian independence took place in no less than six key
cities in the region -Jining, Hailar, Tongliao. Xilinhot,
Linhe and Erenhot - between November 1991 and January 1992.
According to the report, more than 20 people were injured in
Tongliao on November 6 when demonstrating herdsmen exchanged
gunfire with PLA troops sent in to quell the protest.9
In early February 1992, Asia Watch received a broadly
similar report from a Western traveller who had returned from
the region in late January. According to the source, large and
sometimes violent protest demonstrations had occurred in
Bailar, Jining, Erenhot and Xilinhot in recent weeks. Calls
for reunification with the MPR had been raised and a number of
workers and others had been arrested.
Why the Crackdown?
The
continuing crackdown by Beijing against ethnic and political
dissent in the IMAR reflects the central authorities' intense
current concern over two separate but related issues:
incipient nationalist tendencies among the country's ethnic
minorities, and the broader nationwide trend toward democracy
which was abruptly suppressed on June 4, 1989. Concerning the
two Mongolian study groups in Ih Ju and Bayannur Leagues, the
Party's top-secret Document No.13 specifically noted:
“It is clear that our struggle against these illegal
organizations is in fact the continuation of our struggle
against bourgeois liberalism. It is the concrete expression of
the struggle between subversion and anti-subversion,
infiltration and anti-infiltration, peaceful evolution and
anti-peaceful evolution in our region.”
More
recently, Wang Qun, Party secretary of the IMAR, has denounced
alleged Western interference in the region and urged Inner
Mongolians to "build up a great wall of steel against
‘peaceful evolution.’” According to Wang, “At present, hostile
international forces have gone all out to carry out ‘peaceful
evolution’ against China. Their habitual practices include
imposing economic sanctions, stirring up trouble among the
masses, and engaging in sabotage under the guise of
‘nationality,’ ‘religion,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘human rights.’”10
The
real threat to BeiJing’s power in the IMAR seems, however, to
lie much closer to home. As Party General-Secretary Jiang
Zemin pointed out, in a confidential keynote speech of March
1990 entitled “On Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in
the Frontier Regions” (see below for full text):
The "Democratic League" and other opposition groups in the
Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] claim to have the support of
their "Mongolian brothers and sisters" within China's borders.
There are some in the MPR who are vainly trying to establish a
so-called Greater Mongolian State that would include the
Buryat (ethnic Mongolian) Autonomous Republic of the Soviet
Union and also our Inner Mongolia. The slogans used by the
reactionary elements within and outside both Inner Mongolia
and Xinjiang are extremely similar -for example, “No nuclear
testing,” “Against the plunder of our resources” and “Drive
away the outsiders.”
For
several days in October 1991, a group of Mongolian students
(apparently all from the MPR) staged a rare sit-in protest in
sub-zero temperatures outside the Chinese Embassy in Ulan
Bator calling for an end to the repression in Inner Mongolia.
The group handed embassy officials a letter to Premier Li Peng
calling for the release of six imprisoned Inner Mongolian
dissidents and two of China's most famous pro-democracy
figures. “We want the release of the eight prisoners, an end
to Chinese human rights abuses in Inner Mongolia and a stop to
the Chinese policy of assimilating our Inner Mongolian
brothers,” said one of the protestors, a student at Mongolian
State University named Dashdorj Rensentavhai. A notice board
set up by the students carried photographs of them burning the
Chinese flag and a cloth effigy of a Chinese policeman, and
their banner read “Stop Communist Repression in Inner
Mongolia.”11
The charge of separatism and attempting “to
split the motherland” has long been leveled by Beijing against
the pro-independence movement in Tibet. The IMAR, however, is
effectively pan of a divided nation, and this adds a new and
potentially explosive element to the Inner Mongolian question
(and also that of Xinjiang) that is not found in the case of
Tibet. The arrival in 1990 of democratic reforms and the
establishment of a multi-party system in the neighbouring
Mongolian People’s Republic (now renamed the State of
Mongolia) seem clearly to have intensified the sense of
discontentment felt by many ethnic Inner Mongolians within the
context of this divided nationhood.12 As the documents
presented here and in Asia Watch's previous report on Inner
Mongolia indicate, moreover, sections of the emergent
dissident movement there do appear to incline, albeit quite
peacefully, toward the idea of some kind of eventual Mongolian
reunification.
What
is certain is that recent world events, starting with the
Romanian revolution and culminating in the reconstitution of
the former Soviet Asian republics as independent states, have
served to raise the Chinese leadership’s anxieties about such
matters to virtual fever pitch. In the speech cited above,
Jiang Zemin went so far as to warn darkly: “Some people are
vainly searching for a ‘Timisoara’ in China’s ethnic minority
regions.” Given Beijing's current siege mentality on the issue
of political opposition, international scrutiny of the human
rights situation in Inner Mongolia and other ethnic-minority
regions of the People’s Republic is henceforth likely to
become ever more urgent and necessary.
In
the meantime, Asia Watch calls upon the Chinese Government
immediately and unconditionally to release Huchuntegus,
Wang Manglai, Bayantogtokh, Bater, Bao Hongguang, Ulan
Chovo, Wang Shufeng, Qian Shitun, Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen
Uhua, Yang Xudong, Zhang Lishan, Zhang Haiquan, Tasu, Zhao
Guoliang and all others currently imprisoned in the IMAR
on account of their peaceful political beliefs and activities.
A list of known political detainees in Mongolia is attached as
Appendix V.
Appendix
I
Report on Human Rights Conditions in Inner Mongolia (II)
By
Burghud of the
Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights
June
30, 1991
According to disclosures by a public security agent of Inner
Mongolia, after the illegal arrests of Huchuntegus and Wang
Manglai [leaders of the outlawed “Ih Ju League National
Culture Society” ] on May 15 on the pretext of taking them in
for “shelter and investigation” (shourong shencha),
they were secretly sent under escort from the Municipality of
Dongsheng in Ih Ju League to Baotou. Recently, they were moved
again, this time to Hohhot, and are being held in a secret
Jail administered by Section 5 of the Public Security Bureau
of Inner Mongolia. That jail is used by the authorities to
hold the “most dangerous” political prisoners. Huchuntegus and
Wang Manglai have been held incommunicado ever since they were
arrested. Their families are not allowed to visit them. They
do not even know where their loved ones are being held.
Dabushlatu, wife of Huchuntegus, is an accountant working for
the Nationalities Bazaar in the Municipality of Dongsheng. She
is 32, and they have a boy of six. She has constantly been
harassed, watched and followed since her husband's arrest. She
has been illegally questioned many times by the police, and
her personal freedom is being restricted. The authorities
forbade her to travel and ordered the management of the bazaar
to report her words and deeds regularly to the police.
Instigated by the authorities, some people even directly
threatened Dabushlatu's personal safety. On one occasion, when
she was talking in the Mongolian language with someone at her
place of work, she was upbraided and told to shut up by an
ethnic Han colleague. Dabushlatu has lost touch with her
husband and is being subjected to all kinds of pressure. She
is being spiritually tortured and she has no idea when her
travail will end.
Wang
Manglai's wife is an editor working for the local television
station in Ih Ju League. They have two children; the younger
one is still in its infancy. Her husband’s arrest by the
police deeply traumatized her. She cannot even find a nanny to
look after her children so that she could go to work. She has
spent the month and a half in agony, fear and helplessness.
She only wishes to know where her husband is being held and
when she could see him, if only for a moment. But no one knows
how long Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai will be kept in prison.
As
for the fate of Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai, people have
fears that an open and fair trial is almost out of the
question. This is because the authorities really cannot
produce any evidence to show that the defendants violated any
Chinese laws that are in force. According to document number
13 of 1991 issued by the Office of Inner Mongolia Communist
Party Committee, their "crime" consists primarily of the
following three points:
1.
having founded an illegal organization;
2.
having worked to split the nationalities and propagated
bourgeois-liberal ideas;
3.
having illegally printed and distributed a political tract
published in the Mongolian
People’s Republic.
But
none of these three charges are tenable.
First, Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai initiated the founding of
the Ih Ju League National Cultural Society in September 1990.
Since then, they have repeatedly applied to register with the
proper authorities in accordance with the procedures laid down
by the authorities. They were told that that was the time for
re-registering the existing organizations and that new
organizations would have to wait. It was under those
circumstances that they formed the preparatory group for the
founding of the society at the suggestion of the propaganda
department of the Ih Ju League communist party committee.
Document No.13 of the Inner Mongolia Communist Party committee
accuses them of “trying in vain to gain legal status.” But it
is stipulated in explicit terms in the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China that people enjoy the freedom of
association. We would like to know if the Inner Mongolia
Communist Party means to accuse this particular stipulation in
the Chinese Constitution drawn up under the auspices of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Secondly, six scholarly lectures were organized and
Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai wrote four or five articles after
the preparatory group was formed. All these activities had the
approval of the local authorities concerned. The articles were
also sent to the concerned officials to look over. There is
nothing in them that violates the law or “attacks” the Chinese
communist party or government. Yet, the authorities hold that
in his "Letter to Mr. X"13 (In Mongolian) Huchuntegus “incited
nationalist sentiments and created national splits, and
vilified” communist cadres. In the introduction to his article
“The Past, Present and Future of Mongolian Culture,” Wang
Manglai discussed three adverse influences suffered by
Mongolian culture since the Ching (Manchu) Dynasty, the latest
being the impact of the “red culture.” This was accused by the
authorities as “anti-communist party and anti-socialist
system,” and an “attempt” to overthrow the leadership of the
communist party." What this amounts to is obvious: “If you are
out to condemn somebody, you can always trump up a charge,” as
the Chinese saying goes.
Thirdly, in 1990, a book entitled On the Threshold of the
Twenty-First Century14 was published in Ulan
Bator, Outer Mongolia. In order to acquaint the members of the
proposed society with the thoughts and aspirations of fellow
Mongolians in Outer Mongolia and the problems the latter are
facing, the preparatory group of the society translated that
book into archaic Mongolian, typed and mimeographed scores of
copies at its own expense for members of the society to be
passed on to one another among themselves. This was considered
by the authorities as evidence of “hostile international
forces” trying to “infiltrate and influence Inner Mongolia.”
But at the same time, books that are far more tendentious than
the one in question in advocating “liberalism” and “peaceful
evolution” are readily available at bookstores all over China.
To cite just one example, former president Richard Nixon's
1991: Winning Without War (in Chinese translation). Original
and pirate editions from Hong Kong and Taiwan are also openly
sold in mainland China. All kinds of “reference materials for
internal use” and “printed and distributed for internal use”
as well as “materials,” “conference proceedings,” etc. put out
by various organizations and units are literally everywhere.
Many of them reflect Western point of view and advocate
“bourgeois liberalization.” Yet these are not considered by
the authorities as propagating liberalization and negating
communist party leadership. Only Mongolians who did the same
thing are languishing in prison.
In
fact, the Chinese authorities use a double standard in
handling political problems on different nationalities. The
Mongolians do not enjoy equal political rights as the Han
people. In China, the political persecution of minority
nationalities is more severe and the latter’s human rights
conditions are worse. Any word or deed that upholds ethnic
interests or show dissatisfaction with the status quo would be
labeled by the authorities as “creating national splits” or
“undermining the unification of the motherland and the unity
of nationalities.” And such charges can be trumped up at will
according to the needs of the authorities.
The
fate of the other members of the society:
Personal freedom of the other 26 members of the society has
been restricted by the authorities since the arrest of Huchun
and Manglai. They are not allowed to move around a will or
associate with other people. They were repeatedly questioned
and intimidated by the local party and government offices and
the secret police of the public security and national security
bureaus. Some of them have been summoned and questioned a
dozen times. On one occasion, Sechenbayar a member of the
society and a research fellow at the Ih Ju League Genghis Khan
Institute, was questioned by the police continuously for 12
hours from 4 p.m. on June 12 to 6 a.m. the following morning.
During these questioning sessions, the police illegally used
intimidation, insults and corporal punishment, trying to force
or trap them into a confession. They were ordered to sit still
with their hands on their knees and motionless for long
stretches. The police also threatened them not to talk about
their experience with the police. The authorities indicated
that some of the 26 members will also be arrested, most
probably eight of the more active ones.
The
party organizations and administrative leadership of the
places of work of these members of the society have received
orders to put pressure on them, to perform “ideological work”
and persuade them to voluntarily “confess” their “crimes” to
the authorities. As members are constantly subjected to
persecution, their families are also under tremendous mental
pressure. Some are suffering from serious insomnia. Others are
extremely nervous, even exhibiting certain symptoms of nervous
breakdown.
This
is not all. The Ih Ju League authorities, under orders of the
Inner Mongolia communist party committee, are launching a
mandatory study campaign throughout all banners of the league
and the Municipality of Dongsheng. Party and government
cadres, intellectuals, workers and students are called on to
identify themselves with Document No.13 issued by the Inner
Mongolia communist party committee, repudiate and expose the
crimes of national splittism and bourgeois liberalization. It
is not clear as of now how long that campaign will last.
*
During the pro-democracy movement of 1989 in Beijing, there
were also large-scale demonstrations and students boycotted
classes in Hohhot, Baotou and other Inner Mongolian cities.
After “June 4,” the authorities also cracked down on the
participants of the pro-democracy movement. Wang Qun,
secretary of the Inner Mongolia communist party committee, was
one of the local leaders who advocated suppression most
vehemently and the first “prince” to come out in support of
the June 4 massacre. He is also remembered as the first of the
party secretaries of the various provinces and autonomous
regions to cable his respect to Deng Xiaoping and the other
“proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation,” who
ordered the Beijing massacre. But Wang Qun’s barefaced
flattery and boot-licking did not win him the appreciation of
the “veteran revolutionaries.” Instead, he became a
laughingstock of the common people. In the past two years, the
20 million Mongolian and Han people in Inner Mongolia became
familiar with the way Wang Qun appears on television, with his
arms akimbo or waving in the air and shouting at the top of
his voice. Especially when he abuses “bourgeois
liberalization” and the “national splittists.” he glares and
his eyeballs bulge. Those are indeed his outstanding
characteristic features.
Around June 4 of last year and this year, posters were put up
and handbills distributed in Hohhot and other Inner Mongolian
cities, commemorating June 4, demanding democracy and human
rights and opposing national oppression and discrimination.
The authorities were frightened. They sent many plainclothes
secret police and agents to university campuses. Many teachers
and students were watched and followed. “Reactionary slogans”
were discovered on the blackboard in a classroom of the
Mongolian language department of the University of Inner
Mongolia around June 4 of 1991. They read “Long live
democracy” and “Long live the Kuomingtang.” More than forty
students who used that classroom were questioned by police one
by one. Several days later, the police arrested Zhang Haiquan
(an ethnic Mongolian), a journalism sophomore. It is not known
where he is being held.
*
According to reliable information, after the arrest of
Bayantogtokh, leader of the Bayannur League of National
Modernization Society, which was branded an illegal
organization by the authorities, he was secretly tried and
sent to Hohhot. He is also being held in the prison
administered by Section 5 of the Public Security Bureau of
Inner Mongolia- Seven members of that society were escorted by
the police to the Municipality of Linhe and questioned there.
Their whereabouts are not known.
*
The fact that the crackdown in Inner Mongolia has attracted
the attention of the international community has greatly
encouraged the people of Inner Mongolia. On May 12 and 14,
many people said they heard the Chinese language program of
the BBC, which reported on events in Inner Mongolia. VOA also
reported those events on June 21. Others reported that news
stories of those events appeared in the Hong Kong Times
(XianggangShibao),Ming Bao and a newspaper in Taiwan.
They are looking forward to learning more from those sources.
*
The disclosure of what happened in Inner Mongolia by foreign
media angered Beijing and Inner Mongolia authorities. They
considered it a serious political matter. According to the
Hong Kong Times, the Chinese authorities are convinced
that a human rights organization is active in Inner Mongolia.
They have ordered the public security and national security
departments to crack the human rights organization case as
soon as possible.
In
addition, the authorities are tightly blocking the passage of
the information about recent events in Inner Mongolia. The
Inner Mongolia communist party committee has ordered the
recall of the top secret Document Number 13 of 1991 issued by
its office to the various units.
Recently, a BBC correspondent called the Ih Ju League
Department of Education about the arrest of Huchuntegus and
others, the person who answered the phone found out the caller
was a correspondent and he reported to the leadership. It was
announced at a meeting of government employees [MS not clear
here] that no information about Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai
could be disclosed to anyone.
*
After the events in IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, Wang Qun became
convinced that there are also “illegal organizations” and
“national splittist elements" in the other six leagues and
four municipalities directly under the autonomous region.
Therefore, as he sent large numbers of public security and
national security agents to IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, he also
deployed secret police in Hohhot, the capital city of Inner
Mongolia, and other leagues and municipalities to make sure
that more “illegal organizations” will be unearthed.
According to reliable information, a task force of some thirty
people was set up headed by Li Maolin, Director of the Public
Security Bureau of Inner Mongolia, to unearth the “illegal
organizations.” It is empowered to muster the entire police
force of Inner Mongolia. And it is made up of police officers
of the ranks of section and department chiefs or above, who
are considered absolutely trustworthy by the authorities. They
are acting in utmost secrecy.
The
authorities in Beijing have been following development in
Inner Mongolia over the past months with great interest. Jiang
Zemin. Li Peng and Qiao Shi have all given instructions on the
work in Inner Mongolia. In order to step up the suppression,
the Beijing authorities have transferred large numbers of
experienced public security and national security agents from
Beijing, Hebei and Shanxi to Inner Mongolia. The Ministry of
Public Security has also sent trouble-shooters to assume
command there.
The
authorities are enlarging the scope of their investigations
and persecution. More and more people are being secretly
questioned, watched and followed. An increasing number of
students, teachers, care and workers are becoming suspects.
Some high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials have also become
targets of investigations. Panic and unease are spreading.
According to some sources, the authorities have expanded their
investigations to ethnic Mongolian college students studying
in universities in the Xianjiang Uigher Autonomous Region and
Gansu, Liaoning and Henan provinces. These students are or
will soon be facing persecution.
*
The Second Convention of the Inner Mongolian Association of
Philosophy and the Social Sciences was held May 10-12. Wang
Qun and Bu He, president of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Region, attended the convention. Wang Qun twice interrupted
presentations by professors and in a harsh tone demanded if
they knew an illegal organization had been unearthed in Ih Ju
League. He then lectured them, claiming that academic issues
were in fact political issues, and that the domestic and
international class enemies were using academic research to
split the nation and undermine the unity of the motherland. He
repeatedly stressed that one of the four ways domestic and
international enemies carried out their “peaceful evolution”
and subversive activities was to recruit agents from among the
high-ranking party and government leaders. That comment gave
high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials the jitters. It also
aroused resentment and disgust among ethnic Mongolian
intellectuals and cadres. Even Han intellectuals were angered
by those comments.
*
The policy of the Beijing authorities toward Inner Mongolia
became harsher over the past few months. In addition to
political and economic measures that were inimical to ethnic
Mongolians, the authorities have also taken action in
education.
At
the end of 1990, Guo Fuchang. director of the Department of
Education for Minorities of the State Education Commission,
jointly with Bai Ying and Jin Daping, respectively head and
deputy-head of the Inner Mongolian Department of Education,
proposed at the Conference on Education Work in Inner Mongolia
that, beginning with first graders, the study of the Han
(Chinese) language would be mandatory for all pupils of the
ethnic Mongolian primary and middle schools, that hereafter,
minority education in Inner Mongolia would be conducted as
much as possible in the Chinese language, and that fewer
special Fields of study and fewer students would be taught in
the Mongolian language at the universities.
The
“All Inner Mongolian Conference on the Teaching of Minority
Languages in Primary and Middle Schools” was convened by the
Inner Mongolian Department of Education in Kulun Banner of
jirem League on June 10-15. At that conference, the above
instructions were communicated to conference participants.
Those instructions were strongly opposed by some sixty
educators who attended the conference. These participants held
that the instructions were tantamount to compulsory
sinicization of the Mongolian nation and total destruction of
Mongolian culture and education.
In
fact, the new policy of the State Education Commission and the
Inner Mongolian Department of Education met with strong
opposition from the ethnic Mongolians at its inception. Last
spring, ethnic Mongolian teachers of Jerim League collectively
wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin to protest the policy. They
warned that the implementation of that policy would trigger
large-scale protests and demonstrations in Inner Mongolia.
This matter has now become the focus of attention of the
ethnic Mongolian cultural and educational circles throughout
Inner Mongolia.
(end
of report)
Appendix
II
On
Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in the Frontier
Regions:
the
Situation and our Views
byJiang
Zemin
March 10.
1990
Comrades:
Today, we invite comrades from minority areas in the frontier
regions as well as those from the greater military areas of
Shenyang. Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu, who are attending the
current plenary session of the central committee, to a forum.
At the same time, we have also invited those comrades from the
various departments of the central committee and the relevant
ministries of the state council attending the plenary session
to take part in a discussion of the problem of further
stabilizing the situation in minority areas in the frontier
regions. Premier Li Peng, comrades Qiao Shi and Song Ping and
comrades Ding Guangen and Yang Baibing are all attending
today's session. This shows that the central committee of the
party, the state council and the military commission of the
central committee are all following with great interest and
attach great importance to the work in minority areas in the
frontier regions.
At
this plenary session of the central committee, we are going to
make an important decision to strengthen the link between the
party and the people, to carry forward the fine tradition of
the mass line. For work in minority areas in the frontier
regions to be successful and to maintain stability of the
situation on the frontiers, we must also unswervingly unite
with and rely on people of every ethnic group, on
military-civilian unity, and together build a solid and
civilized frontier defense, making it truly impregnable.
A
short while ago, comrades Song Hanliang, Bu He and Hu Jintao
talked about the situation in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and
Tibet respectively, and offered some good experiences and
opinions. In what follows, I will speak on the situation and
our opinion on further stabilizing the situation in minority
areas in the frontier regions.
I.
Looking at the situation as a whole, our
frontier regions are stable.
In
the present international and domestic climate, our minority
areas in the frontier regions are able to maintain stability
primarily because, in my opinion, of the following factors:
(1) Over the long course of history, our various ethnic
groups have formed a unified multi-national state. In the past
century and more, in particular, people of all ethnic groups
suffered from invasion, bullying, oppression and exploitation
at the hand of the powers. In their struggles against foreign
domination, the force that holds the various ethnic groups
together, the centripetal force, has become greatly
strengthened, and the “Chinese nation” has become the common
name shared by all who are in the same boat and who go through
thick and thin together.
(2) Proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation
have drawn up a whole set of policies toward the minorities
that integrates the Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory with
the reality of China’s nationalities and fits China's actual
conditions. These policies have manifested specific Chinese
features in the following three ways: first, the principle of
equality for all ethnic groups irrespective of their size. At
a meeting of the central committee in 1953, Chairman Mao, in
summing up, made it clear that “it is all right to make
scientific analysis. But politically we should avoid
distinguishing among a nationality, an ethnic group, or a
tribe.” In accordance with this instruction, the party and
government determined that all stable communities of people
living in China are to be called “nationalities” irrespective
of the size of their population or territory, the stage of
their social development, or whether the main body
of
their population lives within China's borders, provided they
share distinctive features in economic life, spoken and
written language, costume, customs and habits and national
consciousness. At that time. the state council issued a notice
lo abolish or change the place names and names of
nationalities left over from the old China that were insulting
to the minorities. Secondly, regional autonomy of minority
nationalities has become the basic institution for solving
China's nationalities problem, and the slogans of “national
self-determination” and “federalism” have been discarded. As
early as October 23, 1945, the central committee of our party
pointed out: “Our basic policy towards Inner Mongolia at the
present time is to institute regional autonomy.” On February
18, 1946, the central committee pointed out further that “we
demand equality and autonomy for the nationalities in
accordance with the program for peaceful national
construction. But we must not put forward the slogan of
independence or self-determination.” On May 1, 1947, we
established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Thirdly, we
have upheld the policy of unity, progress, close cooperation
and mutual promotion. In 1952, the central committee issued
the “Opinions in principle on the 5-year construction plan for
minority areas,” which explicitly formulated the basic task of
nationalities work as instituting regional autonomy for the
minority nationalities, developing their economy and culture,
and strengthening and consolidating national unity. In the
past forty years, the cause of China's national unity and
progress has achieved brilliant successes. Especially since
the third plenary session of the eleventh central committee,
and with the shift in the focus of our work, the minority
areas and the minorities have made remarkable progress, and
the basis for national unity has been expanded and
strengthened.
(3) After we suppressed the disturbances and rebellion that
broke out last year in Beijing and some other cities, we
strengthened our work in minority areas in the frontier
regions. Last September, the state council issued its document
No. 62 and called a work conference on helping the poor in the
minority areas. I made a speech at that conference. In
October, the central committee of the party made a special
study of the Tibetan question, after which the “Summary of
Minutes of the Politburo Party Committee’s Discussions at the
Conference on Work in Tibet” was issued. The party committee
of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conscientiously communicated
that document and carried out the instructions. In January and
February of this year, after the central committee of the
party and the state council issued a circular on changes in
the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the
various areas promptly studied the document and carried out
the instructions. Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia convened
standing committee meetings, made a special study of the work
to stabilize the situation and took measures. In mid-February,
the party central committee and state council heard a report
of the meeting of the commissioners of the nationalities
commissions of the country. I and Comrade Li Peng both spoke
at the meeting. Our speeches and instructions are being
transmitted and carried out. All this played an important role
in maintaining stability in minority areas in the frontier
regions. February 26 was the New Year of the iron horse
according to the Tibetan calendar. A festive air of joy and
celebrations prevailed in areas where ethnic Tibetans live in
compact communities, including Lhasa. The situation in Lhasa
was also stable on the 5th and 10th of March, [anniversaries
of uprisings-tr.]
II. Even as we fully affirm our achievements, we must
attach great importance to eliminating all sorts of elements
of instability in the frontier regions.
(1) Splittists both within and outside of the country and
other reactionary forces have never ceased their disruptive
activities. The Dalai clique of Tibet, the Isa clique15
of Xinjiang and “Mongolia” of Inner Mongolia established
their joint setup in Switzerland two years ago. It is
publishing its organ periodical in New Delhi. Some splittists
have joined force with those reactionary elements who are
trying to bring about bourgeois liberalization. Some people
are looking in vain for “Timisoara” in China’s minority areas.
Not long ago, Dalai even went so far as to openly ask us to
take the road of the Eastern European countries, and
threatened to change his conciliatory stand. Splittists within
and outside of Tibet have stepped up their disruptive
activities. In Luolong County of Changdu area, three cases of
bombing, murder and reactionary slogan took place in a single
day. The “Democratic League” and other opposition groups in
the Mongolian People’s Republic [MPR] claim to have the
support of their “Mongolian brothers and sisters” within
China’s borders. There are some in the MPR who are vainly
trying to establish a so-called Greater Mongolian state that
would include the Buryat (ethnic Mongolian) Autonomous
Republic of the Soviet Union and also our Inner Mongolia. The
slogans used by the reactionary elements within and outside
both Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are extremely similar -- for
example, “No nuclear testing,” “Against the plunder of our
resources,” and “Drive away the outsiders.”
(2) Compared with other areas of the hinterland, the
frontier regions lag far behind in economic and cultural
development. To this day, some of the minority people still do
not have enough to eat and wear. Certain areas and departments
are negligent of the nationalities question in their work.
They apply the same formula to quite different cases.
Development of resources in minority areas by the state gives
a great impetus to the growth of those areas. But insufficient
attention has been paid to local development and the interests
of the minority people. To tackle these problems step by step,
the state council has taken and is still taking the necessary
measures. Work to help the poor has been very effective. But
still greater efforts are needed to have the policies and
measures properly implemented. Bridging the gap is a long-term
tasks.
(3) As a result of the lack of breadth and depth of the
work of propaganda and education in the Marxist view and
theory of nationalities and the party's policy towards the
nationalities, and especially the inadequacy of the education
of youngsters, part of the writers and artists and cadres,
incidents that hurt the feelings of the minority people on
such sensitive issues as customs and habits and religious
belief still occur from time to time. There are very close
links between those minority people who live in compact
communities in the frontier regions and those who are
scattered in the hinterland. An incident in one place rapidly
impacts on another. The book on “Sexual Habits” touched off
considerable commotion.16 Tens of thousands took to
the streets in Urumchi and Lanzhou. They rushed the leading
organs, vandalized and burned automobiles.
We
take the above-mentioned problems and other elements of
instability very seriously and shall tackle them in real
earnest. We would rather regard the problems as more serious
than they really are so as to heighten our vigilance and
provide against possible trouble; we must never lower our
guard.
III. In the days to come, work in several fields must be
conscientiously done well.
On
the whole, provided we uphold the set of principles and
policies that has stood the test of practice, closely unite
with and firmly rely on people of the various nationalities
and work had to perform our tasks well, we shall be able to
ride out the storm, continue to maintain stability in the
minority areas in the frontier regions, and steadily improve
the situation there. Otherwise, rather big problems and
troubles may crop up in the present climate and as a result of
incitement and disruption on the pan of the hostile domestic
and foreign forces.
(1) Take a clear-cut stand in fighting divisive activities
and infiltration. Those who engage in divisive activities are
always in the minority. But we must maintain sharp vigilance
and beware of the disruption and damage they could inflict on
us, unite with and rely on the broad masses of the cadres and
people and wage a resolute struggle against them. We must take
the initiative to eliminate hidden danger and take effective
preventive measures. At the same time, we must draw up advance
plans to deal with emergencies so as to be prepared against
every contingency. We must try as much as possible to nip the
disruptive activities in the bud and never allow them to grow
and spread. We must also be on guard against those who try to
infiltrate under the cloak of religion and take preventive
measures.
(2) We must promote economic and cultural development in a
down-to-earth manner. It is especially important to achieve
solid economic growth, show solicitude for people’s
livelihood, and solve the problem of providing adequate food
and clothing for the people once for all and as quickly as
possible, help them shed their poverty and become well-to-do,
and advance towards prosperity for all. Those measures adopted
by the state council that have proven effective must be
implemented in earnest. In the days to come, our policy should
further favor the poverty-stricken areas and areas of the old
and the young. While stressing self-reliance, it is also
necessary to give them assistance and support.
(3) Continue to open up the minority areas in the frontier
regions to the outside world, develop good-neighborly and
friendly relations and border trade, as well as economic and
technological cooperation. At the same time, border trade must
be effectively managed, so that it can play a positive role
and its negative side can be overcome and it can develop in a
healthy manner.
(4) Step up propaganda and education in the
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist view of nationalities, focusing on
leading cadres at all levels, intellectuals and young people.
Sensitive issues likely to ignite mass emotions should be
promptly handled properly and with prudence. Propaganda and
public opinion shaping should be conducted successfully,
starting from the desire to strengthen national unity and
stabilize the overall situation. For example, some minority
people take exception to such formulations as “descendants of
Emperors Yan and Huang” [generally regarded as the ancestors
of the Han people-tr.]. We may consider using such phrases
domestically as the “Chinese nation,” “sons and daughters of
China,” so as to better appeal to the minorities. Again, for
example, in propagating certain historical events and figures,
one could learn from the spirit of the then premier Zhou Enlai,
when he urged dramatists to write historical plays about
“Princess Wencheng” and “Wang Zhaojun” [Chinese princess and
court lady married to minority chiefs-tr.]. We must uphold the
historical materialist stand, guide the people to look
forward, and promote the unity among the various
nationalities.
(5) We must adopt effective measures to enforce in full the
"Law of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities," and promptly
enact the necessary decrees for this purpose. The key to
enforcing the said law is to foster large numbers of cadres
and all sorts of qualified personnel, who have both ability
and political integrity. It is especially important to foster
high-ranking minority cadres, who are versed in the
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist view of nationalities.
(6) Step up the building of our frontier defense. The
frontier guards are an important force in stabilizing the
situation in the frontier regions. Effective measures must be
taken to solve the problems and difficulties the frontier
guards are facing. We must strengthen the joint defense of the
guard units, the police and civilians, and effectively wage a
struggle against infiltration and subversion, safeguard the
normal order of openness to the outside world, defend the
frontiers and the security of our country.
Comrades: The minority people in the frontier region love the
party and socialism ardently. I personally experienced this
last year, when I visited the area where the Jino people live
in compact communities in Xishuangbanna Prefecture ofYunnan
Province. We shall be able continuously to maintain stability
in the minority areas in the frontier regions and promote all
our undertakings successfully, provided we serve the people of
all nationalities wholeheartedly, rally them together closely
and rely on the cadres and people of the various nationalities
and perform our tasks well.
(This document is issued to the provincial and army levels. In
the provinces and
autonomous regions of minority areas in the frontier regions,
it may be transmitted to units at the county and regimental
levels. Copies may be printed as needed, but must be strictly
controlled.)
Appendix III
SECRET
Document of the Office of the Peopled Government
of
the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Inner/Government/Office/Issue (1991) No. 45
March 29. 1991
Circular on Matters Needing Attention of Citizens
in
Their Contacts with Foreign Nationals in the Open
Cities and Areas of Our Region
To
the administrative offices of the various leagues, the
municipal people’s governments, the banner, county (municipal)
people’s governments concerned, the various commissions,
offices, departments and bureaus of the autonomous region, and
the various major enterprises and institutions:
In
the wake of the extensive and deepgoing development of reform
and openness of our region, citizens in the cities and areas
open to foreign visitors have come into increasing contact
with foreign nationals. In order to ensure that the party’s
foreign policy is faithfully carried out, the discipline in
conducting foreign affairs is strictly observed, and the
people are guided to adhere to the principles governing
foreign affairs activities and contacts with foreign
nationals, we list the following points of attention in
accordance with the principle enunciated in recent years of
tightening the control of dealings with foreign nationals. All
units are expected to propagate them and educate the cadres
and masses in them, and overcome existing unhealthy
tendencies, so as to improve our foreign affairs work.
1. In dealing with foreign nationals, it is necessary to
work for friendship, to promote friendship with people of all
countries of the world; to demonstrate ardent love for the
motherland and national integrity; to uphold state and
national dignity; pay attention to our national style and
one's personality; be particular about one’s demeanor and
bearing; be civil and polite, modest and prudent; behave with
self-respect, neither supercilious nor obsequious.
2. Treat all foreign nationals equally without
discrimination, irrespective of the color of their skin, the
size of their country, their rank, their customs and habits,
or their religious belief. Be warm and friendly and polite,
avoid favoring one and be prejudiced against another, or
detesting the poor and favoring the rich. In dealing with
foreign nationals, one must have a sense of propriety and
consider the possible political effect. Be prudent in
expressing one’s views on sensitive international domestic
issues, so as to avoid unnecessary disputes or incidents in
foreign affairs.
3. In dealing with foreign nationals, one must uphold the
four basic principles, oppose bourgeois liberalization and
watch with vigilance the infiltration by hostile foreign
forces. It is necessary consciously to implement our country’s
foreign policy, uphold the “One China” principle, and oppose
any attempt to create “two Chinas” or “One China One Taiwan,”
and words and deeds that undermine national unity. One must
safeguard the unity of the motherland, defend state
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. One must strictly keep party and state secrets, be on
the alert for foreign nationals who try to pry and spy out our
restricted information. Once it is discovered that foreign
nationals who engage in collecting intelligence, spreading
rumors, stirring up trouble or other illegal activities, it
must be promptly reported to one's organization as well as the
security organ of the state. Do not hint to foreign nationals
that oneself or one’s children would like to go abroad.
Generally speaking, foreign nationals should not be invited to
one’s house. No one is allowed to get in touch or contact
foreign embassies or consulates in China without
authorization. Do not give one’s name and address and those of
one’s home and unit to foreign nationals who are total
strangers and whose background is unknown.
5. Exchanging currencies with foreign nationals, asking
them for money or gifts, or to buy on one’s behalf commodities
that are in short supply, forcing them to buy things from
oneself, or asking them to pass on appeals or petitions are
prohibited. No one is allowed to take advantage of his (her)
dealings with foreign nationals for personal gain, or engage
in activities that are harmful to the interests of our country
and our people.
6. Should foreign nationals request to meet with their
Chinese friends or relatives, schoolmates or colleagues, visit
their homes, have dinner or stay overnight, this must be
approved by the leadership of the unit where the person(s)
involved work, and reported to the foreign affairs department.
In the case of staying overnight, registration with the public
security organ is mandatory according to the regulations.
7. As for those foreign nationals who go straight to our
grassroots units or residencies, their intention must be found
out. If they want to pay a visit or collect news, they should
be asked to get in touch with the local foreign affairs
department through the unit that received them. Those who
ignore our dissuasion and try to crash the gate must be
promptly reported to the relevant department for proper
handling.
8. In case foreign nationals ask by mail for certain
information about our country, or try to locate their old
acquaintances of pre-liberation days, the recipients of those
letters should promptly inform the relevant departments and
decide whether to supply the requested information. If the
background of the letter sender is not known, or the person he
is trying to locate is unfit for foreign dealings, the
communications should be ignored.
9. Do not fill out the questionnaires or forms sent by
foreign nationals or institutions. Instead, these should be
reported to the leadership of the unit where one works, or to
the foreign affairs department in charge for study, so that
the matter could be settled as it sees fit.
One
may submit manuscript(s) if solicited by foreign countries.
But no restricted information should be disclosed. One must
not respond to those solicitations if the background of the
sponsor is unknown, or the contents solicited run counter to
China’s foreign policy or to China’s national conditions or
the prevailing moral standards.
10. Books, periodicals and materials sent by foreign
professionals to their Chinese colleagues may be accepted if
these are truly valuable reference materials. Chinese
professionals may also send them our books, periodicals and
materials in return. But these materials must be openly
published ones. Any unpublished material must be reported to
the leadership of the unit concerned, or to the department in
charge for approval.
11. Individuals who receive invitations or tickets directly
mailed to them by foreign embassies in China should ask for
instructions from the leadership of their units or from the
foreign affairs department. No one is allowed to attend or
transfer his (her) invitation or ticket to others without
authorization. In case foreign nationals invite Chinese
personnel to view something with all sons of tickets, they
should be politely turned down.
12. Every citizen enjoys the freedom to communicate with
foreign nationals by letters. But the letters must not touch
on China’s secrets. One must not send souvenirs to leaders of
foreign governments without authorization, nor ask for their
inscriptions or autographs, so as to avoid unnecessary
troubles. Recipients may write to thank foreign nationals for
letters of thanks or greetings and group pictures received.
13. Foreign nationals may take pictures wherever they are
allowed to go. Those exceptional individuals who, with
malicious designs, try to get some insulting shots should be
criticized and the incident reported to the departments
concerned. Eye-catching notices in both Chinese and foreign
languages should be put up where foreign nationals are not
allowed to take pictures.
It
is up to the person(s) concerned to decide whether to agree to
a foreign national’s request, as a friendly gesture, to have a
picture taken together with him (her). Other people should not
try to interfere.
14. Travel routes in all open areas and wherever foreign
travellers are allowed to visit must be kept open. No one is
allowed to block these routes.
15. Citizens living in areas where border posts are located
must observe the relevant provisions in dealing with foreign
nationals.
Concrete problems arising from the implementation of this
circular may be reported to the office of foreign affairs of
the autonomous region.
Copies for the various departments of the communist party
committee of the autonomous region, office of the standing
committee of the People*s Congress, office of the Political
Consultative Conference, the headquarters of the Inner
Mongolian military region, the higher peopled court, the
procuratorate, the various mass organizations and news
organizations.
Office of the People's Government of the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region.
Printed and issued on April 3, 1991.
Number of copies printed: 1,000.
Appendix IV
Document of the Foreign Affairs Office
of
the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Inner/Foreign/Issue (1991) No. 26
April 17. 1991
Urgent Circular on the Management and Reception
of
Uninvited Groups or Groups to be Invited but Already
Arriving
from [Outer] Mongolia
TO:
The administrative offices of the various leagues, the
municipal people’s governments, the various commissions,
offices, departments and bureaus of the autonomous region, the
Hohhot Railway Bureau, the Civil Aviation Administration, the
various major factories and mines and colleges and
universities:
With
the normalization and steady development of relations between
the governments and parties of China and Mongolia [the Peopled
Republic of Mongolia], exchanges and cooperation between our
region and Mongolia are increasing, interregional intercourse
is also steadily rising. A situation has emerged in which
exchanges involve extensive areas: they take place at many
different levels and through many different channels. In 1990,
892 government functionaries (including 215 guest workers)
were sent to Mongolia from our region, constituting the second
largest group sent abroad from China that year. One hundred
and eleven Mongolian government functionaries were invited to
visit our region, representing the largest group of invited
foreign visitors to China. These exchanges helped improve
mutual understanding and traditional friendship between the
Chinese and Mongolian peoples, and promote the growth of
good-neighborly and friendly relations.
In
the course of these exchanges, however, the Mongolians have
become overly impatient, overly enthusiastic and overly
unruly. A major manifestation of this is that an increasing
number of uninvited groups are coming and groups to be invited
are already arriving on their own. As far as we know, two
groups with a total of 15 members were to be invited in 1989,
but they came without waiting for the official invitation, and
all their members were functionaries at the provincial and
ministerial levels. In 1990, 15 groups, with a total of 56
members, came either uninvited or before planned invitations
materialized. In 1991, there were already nine groups with 48
members so far. The sudden arrival of these groups caused
certain difficulties and inconveniences in our reception work
and foreign affairs management. In addition, the Mongolians
often mix economic and trade exchanges with cultural ones and
are keen on exchanging personal visits. The contents of
certain agreements are rather confused, and this is not
conducive to meaningful cooperation. We hold that the problem
is primarily caused by the Mongolian side. The Autonomous
Region plans to make representations to the Mongolians side
through diplomatic channels and request that they correct the
situation. At the same time, we too need to improve our
education and strengthen our management. Otherwise, control
will become still more difficult once railway service between
Hohhot and Ulan Bator begins and the number of passengers
increases. We have therefore enacted the following provisions
for managing the visiting groups. The various areas and units
are expected to act accordingly.
1. As a matter of principle, the various areas and
departments should not receive uninvited groups or
individuals. In case the latter contact our relevant areas or
counterpart departments directly or through their consulate
general in Hohhut, the areas or departments concerned must not
make commitments on their own. If they consider the contact
desirable, they should send a written report to the foreign
affairs office of the autonomous region. With the approval of
the foreign affairs office, the visitors may be received in a
low-key manner. Both the duration of the visit and the
activities of the visitors are to be curtailed. And in
principle, no visits are to be arranged, no banquets, and our
side should not be responsible for the visitors’ room and
board and other expenses.
2. The public security and national security department
should take measures to keep close track of the uninvited
groups or individuals. The hotels, hostels, guest houses,
travel agencies and other service departments should work
closely together and at the same time ensure the safety of the
foreign visitors.
3. Once the areas or departments receive word that those
groups or individuals to be invited are coming ahead of
schedule on their own, they should be effectively persuaded
not to depart. They should be told: “We have not yet completed
the preparations for your reception. Please wait for our
formal invitation before departure.”
4. In case the group to be invited has already arrived,
the formalities of invitation should immediately be made up
according to procedures. A description of the visiting group,
the plan for its reception and the itinerary of its visit
should be submitted to the foreign affairs office for
approval. The reception should also be low-key.
5. In their visits abroad or receptions, the various areas
and departments should not make commitments in cases where the
invitations have not been approved. The formal invitations
should be made strictly in accordance with the documents no.
179 (1989) and no. 23 (1991) issued by the office of the
people's government of Inner Mongolia. In signing protocols of
intention and agreements, the provisions governing personnel
exchanges should be strictly adhered to.
Copies for report to: Secretary Wang Qun, Chairman Bu He and
Vice-Chairman Zhao Zhihong
Copies for: Office of the Communist Party Committee of
the Autonomous Region, Office of the Government, and Office of
the People’s Congress.
Appendix V: Previously Reported Cases of
Concern
In
May and June 1989, as pan of the nationwide pro-democracy
movement, major protest demonstrations occurred in the IMAR.
According to an official “internal-use-only” account of the
1989 movement, for example, more than 10,000 students
demonstrated in Hohhot on May 22, shouting slogans such as
“Support Zhao Ziyang” and “Down with Li Peng.”17
While little is known about the subsequent crackdown and scope
of arrests in the region, a number of specific cases were
recorded by Asia Watch. According to Inner Mongolia Radio,
Yuan Chihe (also known as Tasu). 23, a student
at the Baotou Normal College and alleged chief director of the
Autonomous Federation of Students from Outside Beijing
(AFSOB); Wang Shufeng, 21, a Beijing University student
who allegedly helped lead the student hunger strike in
Tiananmen Square in mid-May; and Qian Shitun, said to
be a “core member” of the AFSOB, were all detained on June 20,
1989 by the public security authorities in Baotou City.18
Nothing has since been heard of the three students, and the
Chinese Government failed to account for them in its November
1991 reply to a list of over 800 pro-democracy detainees
earlier submitted to Beijing by the U.S. State Department.
Also
left unaccounted for by the Chinese Government in that reply
were Zhao Guoliang. 22, a self-employed garment vendor
from Wuhai City, and a man named Han Yanjun. 24, both
of whom were alleged by Inner Mongolia Radio to have
been “backbone elements” of the Beijing Dare-to-Die Corps,
a spontaneous citizens’ group established in late May 1989 to
defend the students in Tiananmen Square.19
According to the news broadcast, the two travelled by train to
Chifeng City on June 4, 1989 to “incite rebellion” in schools,
and were arrested by the Chifeng Public Security Bureau the
following day. Zhao Guoliang was accused of kidnapping two
police officers and “storming” the Beijing Public Security
Bureau; he was further said to have helped student leader Chai
Ling leave Tiananmen Square on the morning of June 4,1989. Han
Yanjun, from Dingzhou City in Hebei Province, was accused of
“setting up roadblocks and attacking troops in Tiananmen
Square” and of subsequently “spreading rumors” that troops had
caused bloodshed in the square. Asia Watch is concerned that
the person originally reported to be named “Han Yanjun” may in
fact be Han Weijun. who was officially reported to have
been execured.on March 14, 1991 for allegedly burning an army
personnel carrier during the June 1989 crackdown.20
Other 1989 pro-democracy detainees from the IMAR left
unaccounted for in the November 1991 Chinese Government reply
include Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen Lihua,
Yang Xudong and Zhang Lishan, all reportedly
leaders of the Hohhot Workers Autonomous Federation.
According to a statement given by the Chinese authorities to
the International Labor Organization in October 1990, the five
workers had “not been arrested and their cases have not been
brought before the judicial authorities.”21 Most
probably, however, this formulation means that the five were
extra-judicially sentenced to several-year terms of
“reeducation through labor” by the public security
authorities.
Appendix VI: Labor Camps, Prisons and other
Detention Units in Inner Mongolia22
1.
Bao'anzhao Labor-Reform Detachment 23
(Neimenggu Bao'anzhao Laogai Zhidui)
[Loc: Jalaid Banner]
2.
Baotou Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 24
(Baotou Shi Laojiaosuo).
Product: stone and rock. Also: supplies laborers-to the
Baotou Iron and Steel Mill.
[Loc: Baotou Municipality]
3.
Bayannur League Labor-Reform Farm 25
(Bayannao'er Meng Laogai Nongchang)
[Loc: Bayannur League]
4.
Bayun E’bo Mining District (certain units only) 26
(Bayun
‘bo Kuang Qu).
Product: rare earths)
[Loc: Baotou Municipality]
5.
Chifeng Labor-Reform Detachment 27
(Neimenggu Chifeng Laogai Zhidui)
[Loc: in Chifeng City]
6.
Chifeng Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 28
(Chifeng Shi Laojiaosuo).
Product: ceramic tile.
[Loc: in Chifeng City]
7.
Chifeng New Life Tile Factory 29
(
[Chifeng Shi] Xinsheng Zhuan Chang)
[Loc: vicinity ofWusan, to west of Chifeng City]
8.
Chifeng Precious Stones Quarry (a subsidiary of the Harqin
Banner New Life Precious Stones Mine) 30
(Halaqin Qj. Xinsheng Yingshi Kuang Chifeng Yingshi Chang)
[Loc: eastern suburbs of Chifeng City]
9.
Fengzhen Labor-Reeducation Center 31
[Loc: Fengzhen County]
10.
Dongtucheng Farm 32
(Neimenggu Laogaiju Dongtucheng Nongchang)
[Loc: Wuyuan County]
11.
Hailar Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 33
(Hailaer Shi Laojiaosuo).
Product: red brick.
[Loc: Hailar Municipality]
12.
Harqin Banner Precious Stones Mine34
(Halaqin Qt Yingshi Kuang)
[Loc: vicinity of Sishijiazi, southwest of Harqin Town]
13.
Hohhot Railways Bureau Remand Center 35
(Hu-Tie-Ju Kanshousuo)
[Loc: east side of Hohhot City]
14.
Hohhot Railways Bureau Labor-Reeducation Brigade36
(Hu-Tie-Ju Laojiao Dui)
[Loc: east side of Hohot City]
15.
Inner Mongolia Prison 37
[Loc: southern suburbs of Hohhot Municipality]
16.
Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 Labor-Reform
Detachments38
[Loc: unknown]
17.
Inner Mongolia Regional No.4 Labor-Reform Detachment39
(Nei
Mong Qu Disi Laogai Zhidui)
[Loc: unknown]
18.
Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 6 and 7 Labor-Reform Detachment
40
[Loc: Baotou Municipality]
19.
Inner Mongolia Regional Juvenile Offenders Center 41
(Nei
Mong Qu Shao-Guan-Suo)
[Loc: probably in Bao*anzhao, Jalaid Banner)
20.
Jining Labor-Reeducation Center 42
(Loc: Jining County)
21.Lijia(aCoalMine43
(Nei Meng
Laogaiju Lijiata Meikuang)
[Loc: Ih Ju League, northeast of Dongsheng Municipality, in
Jungar Banner]
22.
Linhe Municipal Detention Center 44
(Linhe Shi Kansfwusuo)
[Loc: northwest pan of Linhe City]
23.
New Life Brickyard 45
[Loc: Hohhot Municipality]
24.
New Life Machinery Factory 46
[Hohhot Municipality]
25.
Tumd Right Banner New Life Coal Mine 47
(Tumote Youqi Xinsheng Meikuang)
[Loc: north ofSaIaqi Town, Tumd Right Banner]
26.
Tumd Right Banner New Life Farm 48
(Tumote Youqi Xinsheng Nongchang)
[Loc: east ofSalaqi Town, beside railroad line]
27.
Tumuji Labor-Reeducation Center49
[Loc: Ningcheng County]
28.
Wuhai Labor-Reeducation Center 50
[Loc: Wuhai Municipality]
29. Wulan
Farm 51
(Nei Meng
Wulan Nongchang)
[Loc: unknown]
30.
Labor-Reform Bureau of the IMAR
[Government body responsible for administration of all
prisons, labor-reform camps and juvenile offenders centers in
the region.]
Address: Neimenggu Zizhiqu Laogaiju, Huhehaoteshi
Tongdaobeijie 4 Hao.
Tel:
[Hohhot] 35684.
Bureau Director: Liu Shujing,
Bureau Deputy-Directors: Su Shusen, Zhao Renqin, Cheng
Fuming.52
Errata for Crackdown in
Inner Mongolia
(Asia Watch July 1991)
1)
On “the military suppression, known as the ‘February
counter-current’” (p.4): these were actually two different
events. The “February counter-current” was a military
crackdown on anti-Ulanhu Red Guards carried out by some of
Ulanhu’s old military associates, including Kong Fei, Tala and
Ting Miao. This crackdown then prompted Beijing to send in
non-Inner Mongolian troops, led by Teng Haiqing, to thoroughly
purge the Inner Mongolian leadership; this latter was in fact
the “military suppression” referred to above.
2)
The name “Ulanhu” does not (as was stated on p.4) mean “Red
Sun,” but rather, “Red Son.”
3)
“B.Bagbar” (p. 8) should read “Baabar”; this is a pseudonym
for B. Bat-Bayar, president of the opposition Social
Democratic Party in the former MPR.
4)
“Tsedenbar” (p.9) should read “Tsedenbal.”
5)
“Cholbasan” (p.9) should read “Choibalsan.”
6)
Xi Haiming’s hometown is Naiman Banner, and not (as was stated
on p.16) “Senaiman” Banner.
1. The
groups' activities consisted mainly of holding study meetings
in members' homes, reprinting and circulating academic papers
on Mongol history, and formulating peaceful strategies for the
social and political advancement of China's ethnic Mongolians.
2.
Wang's Mongolian clan name is Uigurjin. In the late 1980s,
Wang did research at the Inner Mongolia Normal University,
gaining an MA. degree on the topic of symbolism in Mongolian
epic literature. He has a wife and three-year-old daughter.
3. The
26 persons placed under house arrest were all members of the
IhJu group's Provisional Council. The list of names, together
with brief biographical information, can be found in Crackdown
in Inner Mongolia (Asia Watch, July 1991), pp.22-26.
4.
Inner Mongolia is subdivided into eight large areas known as
“leagues” (meng), 51 smaller “banners” (qi) and numerous
basic-level units known as sumu. This administrative system
was first introduced into the region during the Manchu Qing
Dynasty. Ih Ju League occupies most of the large plain (pan
desert, part arid grassland) enclosed within the great
north-east-southward bend in the Yellow River, an ancient
heartland of Mongolian culture traditionally known as the
Ordos- The adjacent Bayannur League occupies the large, partly
mountainous territory lying along the northern bank of the
river at the uppermost point on this bend. The population of
the IMAR is about 21 million, with Mongolians being
outnumbered by Han Chinese by a factor of around six to one.
5. In
October 1991, a correspondent from Radio France
Internationale was told by dissident Inner Mongolian
sources in Ulan Bator that the IMAR authorities would soon be
carrying out a wave of up to 400 arrests in the region. (RFI,
“Vague de Repression en Mongolie Interieure.” broadcast
October 16, 1991.) The main target would be an official body,
based in Hohhot but with sizeable branches in Xilin Gol League
and Jirem League, called the Inner Mongolian Youth
Association for the Study of Mongol Culture: around 300
members of this organization were reportedly slated for
arrest. In addition, around 100 members of three previously
unknown underground dissident groups in the region, known
variously as the Inner Mongolian Human Rights Protection
League (Neinunggu Renquan Baohu Tongiwng: the Chinese name
is different from the human rights group cited above), the
Inner Mongolian National Liberation Front (Neimenggu Mimu
Jiefang Zhenxian) and the Inner Mongolian Front for
Democracy (Neimenggu MimAu Zhenxian), were also reportedly
slated as targets in the crackdown. Asia Watch cannot confirm
whether the arrests actually took place.
6. In
Human Rights Watch’s World Report 1992, p.266,
Bayantogtokh's name was incorrectly transliterated as
“Baoyintaoktao.”
7. The
name in Chinese is Wulan Sabu, which could also be
transliterated as “Ulaan Shiivuu,” “Ulaan Chuluu” or even
“Ulaan Sambuu.”
8. “A
warning to reporters who tell China’s secrets,” South China
Morning Post, September 16, 1991.
9.
“Neimeng Liu Cheng’Dongluan’Nao Duti,” (“ ‘Turmoil’
Occurs in Six Inner Mongolian Cities in Support of
Independence” ), Dongxiang, No.1-2, 1992, pp.17.18.
Dongxiang is the sister journal of Zheng Ming
(“Contention.”)
10. “Be
Geared to the Future, Accelerate the Development of Areas
Inhabited by National Minorities,” People's Daily,
January 12, 1992.
11.
Reuters,
October 25, 1991; in South China Morning Post (“Mongolians in
protest to Li”), October 26, 1991.
12. In
January 1992, the Hural, parliament of the State of Mongolia,
ratified a new constitution guaranteeing multi-party
democracy. General elections were scheduled to be held in June
1992, with presidential elections following one year later.
The previously two-chambered Hural was merged into a single
chamber with 76 representatives in all. The former Communist
Party still dominates the Hural, but it has split to produce a
new social-democratic opposition party called the Mongolian
Renaissance Party. Previously, the largest opposition party
was the Democratic Party.
13. This
document was cited in Crackdown in Inner Mongolia (Asia
Watch, July 1991) as “An Open Letter to Mr. ‘Man’.” The
document apparently refers to the protagonist of a long poem
entitled “Man,” written by the MPR author R. Choinom.
Imprisoned in the early 1960s for his outspoken criticisms of
the MPR government, Choinom died in jail, but his poetry
became the symbol of the 1990 democracy movement in the MPR-
His poem "Man" was finally published there on May 25, 1990.
14. The
37-page text of this dialogue appears in a paper delivered by
Professor Gyorgy Kara, of the Uralic and Altaic Department of
Indiana University, to the Midwest Conference of Asian Studies
at Indiana University in November 1990. Professor Gyorgy's
paper also includes bis discussion of a 55-page pamphlet of
articles by B. Bat-Bayar, president of the opposition Social
Democratic Party in the former MPR, as referred to in Asia
Watch's previous report on Inner Mongolia (see item 3 of
ERRATA for Crackdown in Inner Mongolia, below.)
15. The
reference is to Isa YusufAlptekin, elderly exiled leader of
the Uighur nationalists. He now lives in Ankara, Turkey, and
is one of the organizers of Common Voice, a dissident
Chinese ethnic Journal published by a coalition named the
“Allied Committee of the People of Eastern Turkestan,
Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet Presently Under China.” See also
Crackdown in Inner Mongolia (Asia Watch, July 1991), p.
6 and p. 12.
16. See
“Causes of Ethnic Riots Viewed,” FBIS. April 30, 1990.
According to an April 24. 1990 article in the Hong Kong Tang
Tai, riots in Urumqi on May 19. 1989 were due to “the
publication of a book, ‘Sexual Habits,’ on the mainland, which
explains Muslim mosque buildings and decorations in terms of
sex and was regarded by Muslims as a serious blasphemy to
Islam.”
17.
Jingxin Dongpo de 56 Tian
(“Fifty-Six Soul Stirring Days”), State Education Commission
(Beijing, August 1989), p. 159.
18.
Inner Mongolia Radio
broadcast, June 23, 1989; in FBIS. June 27.
19.
Inner Mongolia Radio
broadcast, in FBIS. June 19, 1989.
20.
South China Morning Post,
March 19, 1991.
21. See:
Hearings of the International Labor Organization Committee on
Freedom of Association (November
2 990): Case No.1500. Complaint Against the Government of
China Presented by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU).
22. This
list is not exhaustive. Large areas of Inner Mongolia are
closed to access by foreigners, and it is particularly
difficult to compile information on labor camps and other
detention facilities in the region.
Source references in the footnotes denote the following:
LLLJ:
Laogai Laojiao IMun Yanjiu (“Theoretical Studies in
Labor-Reform and Labor- Reeducation”), a
restricted-circulation bimonthly journal.
FYGY:
Fanmi Yu Gaizao Yanjiu ("Research on Crime and
Reform"), a restricted-circulation bimonthly journal.
ZIP:
Neimenggu. Zishiqu Youzheng Bianma Tuji (“Zipcode Atlas
for the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region”).
SFXZ:
Sift Xingzheng (“Judicial Administration”), a monthly
journal published by the Ministry of Justice.
WU:
Lists of labor-reform camps, prisons and other detention units
compiled by Harry Wu, and cited with permission from his
forthcoming book : Laogai: The Chinese Gulag (Wescview
Press, 1992.)
23. FYGY,
Feb.89, p. 18; ZIP, p.70.
24. LLLY,
Apr.89, p.44.
25. ZIP,
p.I45(i) and p.147. This unit seems to be the same as that
listed by WU as “Langshan Labor-Reform Detachment” and “Xinhua
Farm”. NB: Neimenggu Fengqing (“Inner Mongolian Splendor”;
hereinafter NMGFQ), People’s Daily Press, 1987, p.50,
identifies the Langshan area - where Bayannur League
Labor-Reform Farm lies - as having among the richest deposits
of sulphur-iron ore in the country. Prisoners are used for
sulphur-iron mining elsewhere in China, notably in Guangdong
Province.
26. ZIP, p.
114; and WU. Baiyun E’bo Mining District is a remote
administrative annex of Baotou Municipality, located about 100
km. due north of the municipality proper. The district is in
effect an industrial subsidiary of the Baotou Iron and Steel
Mill, a huge corporation whose main sites are located in and
around Baotou City; it takes its name from an adjacent
Mongolian township named Bayin Aobao. (See also Item 2,
above.)
27. LLLY,
Oct.89, p.53; ZIP, p.30(i).
28. LLLY,
Apr.89, p.44; ZIP, p-30.
29. ZIP,
p.32.
30.
ZIP, p-30 (v).
In addition, ZIP lists the following subsidiary unit of the
Harqin mine: Chifeng Purchasing Group of the Harqin Banner New
life Precious Stones Mine (Ha-Qj. Xinsheng Ymgshikuang Zhu
Chifeng Caigouzu) [location: Chifeng City; ZIP, p.30]. NB:
Directly below this entry (location Chifeng) is listed; “Ha-Qi
Yingshikuang Zhuwiu” - indicating that the Harqin New Life
Precious Stones Mine is not necessarily the same unit as the
Harqin Precious Stones Mine, as listed in ZIP, p-46. The
former is probably a subsidiary of the latter, but may be
located elsewhere in Harqin Banner. See Item 12. below.
31. WU.
32.
ZIP, p-155.
NB: A separate unit, “Dongtucheng Farm” (without the
“Labor-reform Bureau” prefix) is located slightly to the
southwcst. Also, there is another “Dongtucheng” (a town, same
characters) in Wuchuan County [ZIP, p.121.]
33. LLLY,
Apr.89, p.44.
34. ZIP,
p.46; sec also p.30 (v). It is likely that only certain pans
of this enterprise use prison labor: see Footnote 25.
35. ZIP,
p.8 (in). There are many other local-level detention and
remand centers in Inner Mongolia. The ones listed here are
only those known to Asia Watch. NB: Also listed for Hohhot is:
Inner Mongolia Labor-Reform Bureau Hospital (Neimenggu
Laogaiju Yvyuan) [ZIP, p.8 (iii).]
36. ZIP,
p-8 (iii).
37. WU.
38. WU.
39. LLLY,
Oct.90. p.56.
40. WU.
41. LLLY,
Aug.90, p.35. WU also lists a Juvenile Offenders Detention
Center, location Bao’anzhao; but it is not certain that this
is the same as that listed in LLLY.
42. WU.
43.
SFXZ, Jan.91, p.33; ZIP, p.135.
According to NMGFQ (p.42). Inner Mongolia contains 1/3 of
China’s total coal reserves (second only to Shanxi Province);
ranked first among the region’s top 15 coalfields is Ih Ju
League's Jungar Opencast Coalfield. In his 4/25/91 annual
Inner Mongolia Government Work Report (text in NeimengguRihao,
5/9/91), Bu He, chairman of the regional government, described
“the Jungar...large coal and electricity joint production
project” as being an important pan of the national 8th
Five Year Plan and “one of the key energy projects of the
state.” ZIP, p.135 shows Lijiata's precise location within the
Ih Ju League.
44. ZIP, p.
145.
45. WU.
46. WU.
47. ZIP,
p.23.
48. ZIP,
p.23.
49. wu.
50. wu.
51.
SFXZ.Sep.Ql.p.aS.
52.
Zhonggw ZhengfuJigou Minglu, 1989: Xia Juan
(“Directory of Government Organs, 1989: Vol.2”), Xinhua
Publishing House. August 1989, p.79.
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Changing
Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State (Oxford
Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology)
